21 August 1965

Dear Tom:

We have considered the proposal in your letter of 17 August 1965. Because the function you propose for the ad hoc committee appears to be a duplication of what would normally be the continuing role of the SIGINT Committee, I discussed the matter with Admiral Raborn who prefers to continue handling SIGINT matters within the established USIB forum.

I have provided the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee with a copy of your proposal and the Director has instructed him to convene the Committee to consider the matters described under I A. and B., II A. and III A. and B. -- most of which appear to be matters normally dealt with in this Committee and some of which are currently under active consideration.

to provide more realistic terms of reference for further actions by the SIGINT Committee. The Director

to provide more realistic terms of reference for further actions by the SIGINT Committee. The Director has, in fact, conveyed this view to Secretary Rusk in a letter dated 21 August 1965 responding to Secretary Rusk's letter of 12 August 1965.

We are prepared to give further consideration to Agency participation in an ad hoc group to deal with those elements of this problem which do not fall within the competence of USIB. Indeed, I have long felt that the particular significance of a number of countries of

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the Near East and South Asia as SIGINT "real estate" warrants a more formal recognition of the preservation of these facilities as, in itself, an important foreign policy objective of the United States in this area. times there have existed ad hoc arrangements in which the Assistant Secretary for this area, a senior officer from ISA/Defense and the CIA representative responsible for our Near East and South Asia operating division have closely coordinated their respective roles and interests. There have been times when this coordination proved highly effective; on other occasions a closer coordination of State, Defense and Agency roles would probably have proved beneficial. It would be my proposal that we not attempt to establish any ad hoc mechanism which duplicates or more seriously overlaps with the work of existing mechanisms of USIB. Rather, it is on the problem of more closely relating the interest and activities of the Intelligence Community with the broader relations -- including foreign aid -where there is a more urgent need for either a permanent or an ad hoc arrangement. It goes without saying that the Department of State should take the lead in this matter.

Sincerely.

Richard Helms

The Honorable
Thomas L. Hughes
The Director of Intelligence and Research

CNE: J. H. Critchfield: hj: 20 Aug 65

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